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Abstract: This paper will trace the roots of religious 
radicalism in Indonesia with the Padri movement as the 
case in point. It argues that the history of the Padri 
movement is complex and multifaceted. Nevertheless, it 
seems to be clear that the Padri movement was in many 
ways a reincarnation of its counterpart in the Arabian 
Peninsula, the Wahha>bi> movement, even though it was not 
a perfect replica of the latter. While the two shared some 
similarities, they were also quite different in other respects. 
The historical passage of the Padris was therefore not the 
same as that of the Wahha>bi>s. Each movement had its own 
dimensions and peculiarities according to its particular 
context and setting. Despite these differences, both were 
united by the same objective; they were radical in their 
determination to establish what they considered the purest 
version of Islam, and both manipulated religious symbols 
in pursuit of their political agendas. 
Keywords: Padri movement, fundamentalism, radicalism, 
Minangkabau, Wahha >bism. 
Introduction 
Almost all historians agree that Islam in the Malay Archipelago – a 
large part of which subsequently became known as Indonesia – was 
disseminated in a peaceful process. The people of the archipelago 
accepted the religion of Islam wholeheartedly without any pressure or 
compulsion. To a certain extent, these people even treated Islam as 
belonging to their own culture, seeing striking similarities between the 
new religion and existing local traditions. This peaceful process, which 
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characterized the advent of Islam and its dissemination in the 
archipelago, stands as a kind of historical hallmark in Indonesia.   
Nonetheless, the advent of Islam and its continued existence in the 
region were not always marked by peace and harmony. At certain 
phases of its development and in certain areas of the archipelago, 
Islam -or to be more precise certain individuals and groups 
representing Islam- were involved in violent acts. Among the first 
groups that used violence, not only against non-Muslims but also 
against Muslims, was the Padri movement.1  
Even a superficial analysis of this movement reveals that the 
violent acts that its proponents committed over time were the result 
not only of a shallow understanding of religion but also of their 
political ideology. In other words, these violent acts were not born out 
of the blue.  
The Padris’ uncertain interpretation of Islam was constructed in 
such a way that violence might be legitimized. It was here that the 
Padris found a perfect concurrence with the ideology of the Wahha >bi > 
movement in the Arabian Peninsula.  
On the historical link between the two movements, Benda has 
rightly pointed out that what he calls the Pax Wahha >bi >ca attracted the 
attention of many Muslims in the Indonesian archipelago and exerted a 
serious influence on them. This Arabian dogma was also able to 
transcend the doctrinal differences existing among its Indonesian 
adherents and united them in the pursuance for their ideological 
cause.2  
Wahha >bi > beliefs were first brought to Indonesia by early pilgrims, 
who upon their return from the Holy Land disseminated the ideas, 
imbued them with their own interpretative touches and sought to 
ingrain them in the minds and souls of their followers.  
This paper aims at investigating the complexity involved in the 
phenomenon of the Padri movement. It will try first to trace the 
characteristics of the Padri movement, shedding light on its 
                                                 
1 See Azyumardi Azra, “Islamic Radical Movement in Indonesia,”  (Paper presented at 
the Conference “The Link-up Terrorism in Southeast Asia,” Center for Moderate 
Muslim, Jakarta 2006). See also Azyumardi Azra, “Salafisme,” Republika, 14 April 2005. 
2 See Harry J. Benda, The Crescent and the Rising Sun: Indonesian Islam under The Japanese 
Occupation 1942-1945 (Netherlands: W. van Hoeve Ltd. – The Hague and Bandung, 
1958), p. 73. 
  
The Genealogy of Muslim Radicalism in Indonesia 
269 JOURNAL OF INDONESIAN ISLAM 
Volume 02, Number 02, December 2008 
background and mode of religiosity, and then highlighting its acts of 
violence. Then it is necessary to demonstrate the relationship between 
this movement and the Wahha>bi > movement since this relationship 
formed a central part of the Padri’s ideological tenets. The study holds 
that there was indeed such relationship. Although the Padri movement 
might have developed its own normative values, agendas and 
obsessions, an ideological and perhaps pedagogical relationship 
remains possible. While there might have been some kind of 
discontinuity between the two movements, this discontinuity remains 
to be proven.  
The violence that the Padri movement committed was not simply 
ideological or theological in nature. I distinguish between self-defense 
“violence,” ad hoc violence, violence committed for non-religious 
reasons, and religious violence. The Padri movement committed all 
forms violence, although I regard the first form not as violence in a 
pejorative sense.  
Islam in Minangkabau 
Various views have been expressed concerning the precise period 
of the arrival of Islam in Minangkabau, the region in Western Sumatra 
where the Padri movement flourished. One of these views holds that 
Islam –notably in its Sufistic form– was already established in 
Minangkabau in the 14th century.3 This view, however, lacks accurate 
evidence and is ultimately unconvincing. It is unlikely that during that 
period of time Islam was already in Minangkabau because the whole 
region was overwhelmingly Hindu and was controlled by Aditya-
warman, the viceroy of the strong Javanese Hindu Kingdom called 
Majapahit.4 In all likelihood, Islam arrived and then flourished in 
Minangkabau around the 16th century. Quoting Pires, Ricklefs 
maintains that by that time the king of Minangkabau and hundreds of 
his relatives and partisans had already embraced Islam. The masses in 
Minangkabau then followed in the footsteps of their leaders.5 This 
view is considered more accurate, and receives unequivocal approval 
                                                 
3 See Melissa Rimac, “Matrinial Minangkabau,” in http://www.practitionerdirectory.-
com.au/natural_health_article?cid=751&pid=17365. 
4 See M. C. Ricklefs, Sejarah Modern Indonesia 1200-2004 (Jakarta: PT Serambi Ilmu 
Semesta, 2005), p. 302. 
5 Ibid., p. 35. 
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from the historian Dobbin, who believes that the conversion of the 
people of Minangkabau to Islam took place during the period at the 
end of the 16th century and the beginning of the 17th century when the 
Muslim Kingdom of Aceh dominated the whole of Sumatra.6 
Another view says that Islam came to Mingankabau in the 15th 
century. This view is based on a local legend called tambo which 
highlights the idea of creation in the world-view of the Minangkabau.7 
The tambo has it that the world of Minangkabau was created from, as 
Azra quotes, “the light of Muhammad” during the same time that two 
other worlds, namely “Benua Ruhum,” (the Turkish Ottoman 
Empire), and the “Benua Cina” (the Chinese continent) were created.8 
Azra argues that after the Ottoman Empire conquered Constantinople 
in the second half of the 15th century -  in 1453 to be precise - the 
Ottomans established their political and cultural supremacy over some 
parts of the Malay archipelago.9 By associating themselves with the 
Islamic Ottoman Empire, the people of Minangkabau seem to have 
identified themselves as Muslims.  
Because of these conflicting historical accounts, it preferable to 
focus on the mode and process of the Islamisation of this region rather 
than to argue about the exact date of Islam’s arrival. Suffice it to say 
that Islam might have come to Minangkabau during the 14th century, 
but it was only in the 16th century that Islam was established as the 
religion of the majority. What is of paramount importance is to note 
that, once it was established as the public religion as it were, Islam 
became a monumental phenomenon that attracted not only the 
                                                 
6 Christine Dobbin, “Tuanku Imam Bondjol (1772-1864),” Indonesia Vol. 13 (April 
1972), p. 5. 
7 “The World of Minangkabau” is regarded as an integral concept representing the 
overall system, institution and the life of people of Minangkabau. The world of 
Minangkabau consists of three domains, namely lu(h)ak called Agam, Limapuluh Kota, 
and Tanah Datar. Subsequently, the world of Minangkabau also consists of Solok 
known previously as Kubung XIII, and IX Koto. These four regions were known as 
Padang Darat. Each region has what they call nagari numbering at the time 600. See 
Elisabeth E. Graves, Asal Usul Elite Minangkabau Modern: Respons terhadap Belanda Abad 
XIX/XX, Translation (Jakarta: Yayasan Obor Indonesia, 2007), pp. 1-5; pp. 30-31.  
8 Azyumardi Azra, Jaringan Ulama Timur Tengah dan Kepulauan Nusantara Abad XVII dan 
XVIII (Bandung: Penerbit Mizan, 1994), p. 45. 
9 Ibid., pp. 47-48. 
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attention of the converted, but also of people of different cultures, 
races and religions. 
From its establishment, Islam in Minangkabau was identical to its 
Sufistic form. This is apparent, for example, from the popular 
understanding among the people of Minangkabau concerning the idea 
of creation.10 The question remains, however, what kind of Sufism the 
people of this region adhered to. 
According to Fathurrahman the predominant school of Sufism in 
Minangkabau was Shattariyah. This order is recorded to have been 
present here from the return of Shaikh Burhanuddin – leader of 
Shattariyah order - from Aceh. He studied Tasawuf under the 
patronage of the famous Shaikh Abdurrauf al-Sinkili. This order has 
left a marked imprint on the people of this region and guided them to 
what many have recognized as the tolerant form of Islam. The primary 
text of this order is Kitab Menerangkan Agama Islam di Minangkabau (A 
Book on the Explanation of Islam in Minangkabau).11  
The Shattariyah order was disseminated by Burhanuddin's main 
disciples into neighboring regions. By the second half of the 18th 
century, the order had become the sole religious power in 
Minangkabau.12  
A unique characteristic of Shattariyah was that it was able to 
absorb local culture and customs.13 From the beginning of the 
                                                 
10 Ibid., p. 45. 
11 Oman Fathurrahman, “Tarekat Shattariyah di Dunia Melayu-Indonesia: Kajian atas 
Dinamika dan Perkembangannya Melalui Naskah-naskah di Sumatera Barat,” 
(Unpublished Ph.D Dissertation, School of Humanity Studies, Postgraduate Program, 
the University of Indonesia, Jakarta, 2003), p. 164. 
12 They include Shaikh Datuk Maruhun Panjang of Padang Ganting Batussangkar, who 
propagated his teaching in Tanah Datar, Shaikh Tarapang (Syaikh Pandan Baico) of 
Kubung Tiga Belas Solok, who propagated his ideas in Solok and Sijunjung, Shaikh 
Abdul Muhsin (Shaikh Supayang) of Supayang, who worked in Alahan Panjang Muara 
Labuh and Lubuk Gadang, Shaikh Muhammad Nasir (Shaikh Surau Baru) of Koto 
Tangah Padang, in Koto Tangah Pauh Lubuk Bagalung Padang, Shaikh Buyung Muda 
(Shaikh Bayang) of Bayang Bandar, in Bandar Sibupuluh and Kuraji, and Shaikh 
Jalaluddin Kapeh Kapeh of Paninjauan Padang Panjang, in Luhak Agam and Luhak 
Lima Puluh Kota Payakumbuh. See Ibid., pp. 88-89. 
13 See Irina Katkova, “Islamic Manuscripts of Western Sumatera, Problem of 
Investigation and Preservation (on the Materials Field Research Work in Western 
Sumatera of 2006),” in http://www.islamicmanuscript.org/resources/files/katkova_-
Irina_TIMA.pdf/. 
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conversion of the locals to Islam, efforts had been made to reconcile 
Islam with the values of local traditions and culture. The Shattariyah 
order played a constructive role in these efforts. In most cases, the 
process of reconciliation was gradual. Hence Islam was first introduced 
into the coastal regions (rantau), and only then into the inland regions 
(darek, darat). In this strategy lay the conviction that in propagating 
religion it is wise to proceed gradually from step to step.14  
Through the Shattariyah order, the process of reconciliation was 
not only commenced but also intensified. But it was by virtue of the 
reconciling power of this order that “the Islam” of Minangkabau was –  
and perhaps still is - known for its prudence, tolerance and peaceful 
manner.   
Like those of many others, the traditions and customs of the 
Minangkabau are complicated. They form a web of complex 
relationships, drawing together many aspects of human life: social, 
economic and religious. Furthermore, these traditions contain forces 
of both conflict and integration. Within them one may find what is 
commonly called the system of dual laras; Koto Piliang and Bodi Caniago. 
The former concerns the prestige of leadership, where the leader is 
considered to be the sole occupying authority at the top of the 
hierarchy (puncak), whereas the latter concerns the principles of 
egalitarianism, according to which the country (nagari) must be ruled by 
a group of religious leaders from various major clans.15  
Similarly, the social structure of the Minangkabau is just as 
complicated as its traditions and customs. The social structure consists 
of two opposing systems, one monarchical, representing patriarchal 
values, the other a popular system, representing matriarchal norms. In 
the Minangkabau ethos, this dual system of social structure must at the 
end be reconciled if society is to survive. Marriage is the way toward 
that reconciliation because marriage unites two opposing entities – 
man and woman - bringing them together in a spirit of togetherness 
and harmony.16 
Following the Islamisation of Minangkabau in the 16th century, the 
political system in the region changed. A tripartite form of leadership 
                                                 
14 Fathurrahman, “Tarekat Shattariyah,” p. 68. 
15 Taufik Abdullah, “Adat and Islam: An Examination of Conflict in Minangkabau,” 
Indonesia 2 (October 1966), pp. 6-7. 
16 Ibid., p. 4. 
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was then introduced according to which the Kingdom was to be ruled 
by three kings at once. These three kings were the King of Nature 
(Raja Alam), the King of Tradition (Raja Adat) and the King of Rites 
(Raja Ibadat), the kings being known in the local language as Rajo Tigo 
Selo. The King of Tradition – whether man or woman - was seen as the 
personification of patriarchal values. The King of Rites – again, 
whether man or woman - was regarded as representing the matriarchal 
values. Together they were called Rajo Duo Selo and held the 
prerogative authority in their respective domains. Meanwhile, the King 
of Nature was expected to combine the two above-mentioned 
authorities. 
In reality, however, there are doubts whether this kind of political 
system was ever applied in the region, for the heartland of 
Minangkabau (darat) was in fact never ruled by a king. It was ruled by 
religious leaders who ran the government hereditarily. The kings ruled 
only the coastal regions and their territories.17 
Whatever the case might be, what this paper is interested in is the 
fact that the concept of the King of Rites was already recognized as 
part and parcel of the political system in Minangkabau. By any 
standard, this recognition bears an explicit meaning that the people of 
Minangkabau had already acknowledged the public role of religion 
politically and perhaps culturally as well.  
Quite apart from this, the concept of nagari (country) also 
underwent a process of Islamisation. Prior to the advent of Islam, this 
concept was understood as referring only to the social, political and 
economic entity. According to this old concept, the nagari was upheld 
as consisting of a territorial unit comprising agricultural lands, open 
grounds, parks, sources of water, chicken nesting spots and so on. 
Legally speaking, the nagari also consisted of certain rules and was 
associated with certain institutions, traditions or customs.18 With the 
coming of Islam, the nagari was transformed and perhaps modernized 
to encompass such things as the balai, musajik (mosque), labuah (public 
road), and tepian tampek mandi (public washing place). Balai was an 
institution symbolizing the rules of integration and the laws of religion. 
                                                 
17 Ibid., pp. 4-5. 
18 See John S. Ambler, “Historical Perspectives on Sawah Cultivation and the Political 
and Economic Context for Irrigation in West Sumatera,” Indonesia Vol. 46 (October 
1988), p. 42. 
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The members of this institution, who usually had shown strong 
religious and intellectual acumen, were called urang patuik.19  
The respect that Muslims in general, and the Shattariyah order in 
particular, showed towards local traditions in Minangkabau opened up 
the soft ground for the easy process of Islamisation in this region. In 
the same vein, Muslims, from the advent of Islam, never behaved in a 
way that would threaten the original foundation of the local 
community. On the contrary, they helped preserve local culture, 
strengthen its foundations and enrich its elements.20 In this respect, 
credit must go not only to the Muslims in general but also to the 
followers of the Shattariyah order who, thanks to their credible 
understanding of their religion, were able to reconcile Islam with local 
traditions, and contextualize this religion into the new condition that 
they found in Minangkabau. It was through this order that Islam was 
finally and fully integrated into the life of the people of this land.  
All this is to say that both the religious traditions and the local 
customs of Minangkabau were overtly flexible. Both were able to adapt 
to each other, and absorb one another. By the end of the 18th century, 
however, Islam was no longer what it was. It was about to change 
forever. Islam, a religion couched in tolerance and able to understand 
the very fabric of an alien culture, was now about to be transformed 
into another kind of Islam at odds with its own values and norms. It 
was the Naqshabandiyah order that initiated this drastic change. When 
it came to this region, it sent a shock wave through the whole 
community, creating early tension and conflict. The source of this 
conflict was twofold: the inability of the members of this order to 
respect different religious views, and the political struggle for 
domination.21 When the Padris came in as the patrons of the order, the 
situation became even worse. Violence in the name of religion 
prevailed and intimidation became the rule of the day. 
The Padris: Their Advent and Development 
Two decades before the end of the 18th century, Minangkabau was 
known for its gold production. The gold-producing villages in this 
region and other surrounding villages which acted as export routes 
                                                 
19 Abdullah, “Adat and Islam,” p. 12.  
20 Ibid., p. 11. 
21 Fathurrahman, “Tarekat Shattariyah,” pp. 164-165. 
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were supportive of the royal family. However, by the end of that 
century, the gold trade was in decline, and Minangkabau faced serious 
commercial problems as a result. By the 1780s Minangkabau had 
established new commercial centers such as Agam, a cotton producing 
region outside Tanah Datar, which at the same time was also a trade 
hub where Javanese salt traders did business with the locals. This new 
form of trade was quite different from the gold trade in that while the 
former was open to everyone, the latter was controlled only by the 
elites. Between the 1790s and 1830s, Minangkabau, especially the 
regions of Agam and Limapuluh Kota, began to profit from booming 
coffee demands from countries such as the United States of America. 
This and other factors helped shift the mode and nature of the power 
balance within the Minangkabau community.22 Economically speaking, 
men of religion – the clerics and their followers - benefited from this 
shift and gained higher status accordingly. As the mode of trade shifted 
from an elite-based trade to an individual-based one, these clerics 
became the main benefactors because they essentially constituted the 
major element in the society. 
Concomitant to that, this emerging class of clerics, with their 
power and advantages, brought about a new form of social diversity in 
the community. Their economic renaissance had notable 
consequences23 for their own political careers and the political 
opportunities of their followers. All now became major players not 
only in religious domain but also in economic and political arena.  
Following their economic renaissance, Islamic educational 
institutions such as surau began to flourish. Here numbers of Muslim 
students converged to study. At the same time these students were also 
involved in business activities organized by the clerics and their 
institutions. Hence, there occurred a transformation in society, turning 
formerly disadvantaged members into an economically advantaged 
class of new rich. As a result of intensive business activities, these 
                                                 
22 See Christine Dobbin, “Economic Change in Minangkabau as a Factor in the Rise of 
the Padri Movement, 1784-1830,” Indonesia, Vol. 23 (April 1977): pp. 1-21. 
23 Helmut Lukas, “The Perception of Indonesia’s History and Culture by Western 
Historian and Social Scientists,” (Paper presented at the Conference “Indonesia’s 
Cultural Diversity in Time of Global Change,” Indonesian Embassy Brussels, The 
European Institute for Asia Studies, Brussels, The Royal Academy of Overseas 
Sciences, Brussels, and The International Institute for Asian Studies (Leiden: 16 
December 2002), p. 5. 
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people soon became wealthy. Since business activities were reasonably 
lucrative at that time, the number of the rich grew significantly, and the 
number of people leaving for the Holy Land also increased. This 
expansion in pilgrimage in itself provides strong evidence that the 
economy of the people was good.24  
The visit to the Holy Land turned out to be not only a ritual for 
these people, but also a process of learning and perhaps indoctrination. 
They began to hear – and subsequently learn - about the Wahha>bi >yah 
and its principles. A reasonable number of them even became 
acquainted with its teachings and sympathetic to its doctrines. Upon 
their return, they founded a Wahha>bi >-oriented community and 
disseminated its teachings through out the region.  
Among the early Wahha >bi >s in Minangkabau were Haji Miskin of 
Lu(h)ak Agam, Haji Abdur Rahman of Piobang, a sub-region of 
Lu(h)ak Limah Puluh Kota, and Haji Muhammad Arief of Sumanik, 
Batusangkar. Haji Miskin returned from Mecca in either 1803 or 1804 
and soon embarked on a reform mission in his homeland. He believed 
that the structure of the Minangkabau society was not at all in line with 
the teachings of the Qur'an and the Sunnah, and must therefore be 
reformed. He sought a replica of the Saudi style of reform where the 
old structure of society is totally replaced by a new one, regardless of 
the different nature of the existing social structure.25 This idea of total 
reform was welcomed by a large number of people including Haji 
Abdur Rahman and Haji Muhammad Arif. In time, the three reached 
the conclusion that a common platform must be formulated. The 
situation called for a “holy” mission to commence immediately. The 
seeds of the Padri movement were sewn, and intellectual agendas to 
launch what subsequently appeared to be a furious onslaught on their 
foes were then tabled.  
In their effort to undertake radical reform in Minangkabau, the 
three Hajis received strong opposition especially from the leadership 
of the Shattariyah order.26 Haji Miskin for example, was denounced by 
Tuanku Nan Tuo, a religious leader and a former business partner of 
Haji Miskin before the latter left for Mecca. Nan Tuo rejected entirely 
the ideas of Haji Miskin and succeeded in persuading his followers not 
                                                 
24 Dobbin, “Economic Change in Minangkabau,” p. 28.  
25 Ibid., p. 30. 
26 Fathurrahman, “Tarekat Shattariyah,” p. 168. 
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to tolerate those ideas. As a result, Haji Miskin was forced to 
acknowledge his defeat from his former colleague and left for Enam 
Kota. He stayed in Pandai Sikat for a while, and continued to 
propagate his Wahha >bi >-inspired ideas. But here he failed. He then left 
for Kota Lawas where – recognizing the causes of his failure - he 
adopted a new strategy and a more well-planned approach. He 
succeeded here in promoting his ideas and prompting the total reform 
to which he aspired. Eventually, he decided to employ a physical 
approach, burning down public halls (balai) and finally capturing all 
regions in Enam Kota including Kota Lawas and Pandai Sikat.27 
While the Padri movement was initially, organized in a rather 
sporadic and unsystematic manner,  as it matured, it developed a more 
united and centralized form. By the time the Padri movement gained 
real momentum in 1811, Haji Miskin, with the support from Tuanku 
Nan Renceh, another religious leader, was already viewed as the 
strongest leader in the region. Realizing his strength, Haji Miskin 
officially announced that total reform must by now begin.28 He was 
confident that he would succeed. Apart from the popular support that 
he received, he was also backed by the so-called Harimau Nan Selapan, 
eight strong local leaders calling themselves the eight lions: Tuanku of 
Kubu Sanang, Tuanku of Ladang Lawas, Tuanku of Padang Luar, 
Tuanku of Galung, Tuanku of Koto Ambalan, and Tuanku of Lubuk 
Aur.29 (only 6 – are they lions or tigers?) 
In 1813 Tuanku Lintau signed up.30 Some time before that, in 
1807, another strong and charismatic religious leader called Tuanku 
Muda of Alahan Panjang had also joined the group. It was this man, 
later known as Tuanku Imam Bonjol, who transformed the 
organization into something else and gave it the real impetus that 
would move it forward. With his experience and firm leadership, 
Tuanku Imam Bonjol succeeded in exercising considerable power and 
                                                 
27 Dobbin, “Economic Change in Minangkabau,” pp. 30-31. 
28 Ibid., p. 32. 
29 See Suryadi, “Kontroversi Kaum Padri: Jika Bukan Karena Tuanku Nan Renceh,” in 
http://naskahkuno.blogspot.com/2007/11/kontroversi-kaum-paderi-jika-bukan.html; 
Cf. Abdul Qadir Djaelani, “Perang Padri,” in http://www.mail-archive.com/urang-
awak@yahoogroups.com/msg00475.html; Cf. Dobbin, “Tuanku Imam Bondjol,” p. 
10. 
30 Dobbin, “Economic Change in Minangkabau,” P. 36. 
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influence over others, and in his hands, the Padri movement turned  
into a much more solid and well-managed organization. 
Under his leadership, the Padri movement expanded its territory 
beyond Minangkabau to include South Tapanuli and other neighboring 
regions where the Padris recruited new and fresh leaders such as 
Tuanko Rao and Tuanku Tambusai. 
The Intellectual Fundamentalism of the Padris 
Although some might say otherwise, the Padri movement was, in 
my view,  the reincarnation of Wahha >bi >sm in the Arabian Peninsula. It 
is not hard to find apparent congruencies between the two 
movements, for instance in their overt attitude and covert propaganda 
against Tasawuf. The two movements regarded Tasawuf as misleading, 
and must therefore be banned. The Padris also maintained that the 
people of Minangkabau, especially the followers of the Shattariyah 
order were sinful because they committed something not ordained by 
God in His Shari>‘ah. Like the Wahha>bi >s, the Padris were fond of 
labeling other people bid‘ah for practicing certain forms of rituals they 
were not happy with. Like the Wahha>bi >s too, the Padris employed 
physical, often violent means to force people to change their minds, 
beliefs and traditional customs.31  
It is quite clear -as many studies have shown- that in their 
desperate efforts to gain the people’s support, the Padris employed a 
deliberate policy of violence, unfavorable to both society and religion. 
On these grounds, it is legitimate to argue that this movement was 
radical outright. 
For the Padris, Islam could be understood only as they interpreted 
it. No other understandings and interpretations were true. It was on 
this notion that the Padris based all their behavior and conduct. To be 
more precise, the violent acts of the Padris stemmed from a flawed 
understanding of Islam. Hence, Tuanku Nan Renceh launched a 
violent attack against Tuanku Nan Tuo, his own teacher, merely on 
account of slight differences between them in understanding certain 
religious issues of no particular importance whatsoever to Islam. 
Tuanku Nan Renceh went even further by denouncing him and others 
                                                 
31 Fathurrahman, “Tarekat Shattariyah,” p. 167. 
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such as Fakih Saghir as infidels, and nicknaming the latter the “King of 
the Infidels.”32  
Up to this point, one might conclude that the rigid stance of the 
Padris must have been the result of their method and approach in 
understanding the texts of Islam. Their method is deeply rooted in a 
literalistic-textual kind of approach. There might be no apparent 
danger in this approach. But it led to strange consequences. The 
Padris, for example, obliged man to grow his beard, or else be fined. 
They also prohibited men and women from cutting their teeth on pain 
of being fined one adult cow. A man who walked in public with his 
legs bared would also be fined a certain amount of money, and so 
would women who appeared in public without a burka covering her 
whole body save her eyes and hands. Worse still, a person found 
neglecting the s}ala>h (the compulsory five prayers) was to be punished 
the first time with a fine of 5 gulden, and the second time be 
condemned him to death.33 
By virtue of their radical dogma, the Padris not only indoctrinated 
people but also imposed on their codes of conduct and dress. Thus, 
the Padris forced people to wear a long white dress as the compulsory 
form of male dress.34 Those who disobeyed this order would be 
punished. The Padris called themselves “the whites” and were required 
always to appear in that colour.  
In addition to these rather absurd rules and regulations, the Padris 
also formulated religion-based laws that, at first sight, look 
contradictory. For instance Tuanku Imam Bonjol, the highest authority 
in the movement,  while ruling that slavery was prohibited, himself 
owned many slaves. He sometimes also announced publicly that 
slavery was permissible. In his memoir, written by his own hand, 
Tuanku recorded that he had 70 slaves man and women.35 This is an 
apparent contradiction indeed, and is against the very teaching of 
Islam. Islam speaks of freedom, equality and justice for all people 
whatever their race, language, color or religion. The whole mission of 
                                                 
32 Suryadi, ”Kontroversi Kaum Padri.” 
33 Fathurrahman, “Tarekat Shattariyah,” p. 167. 
34 See Dobbin “Tuanku Imam Bondjol,” p. 10; Cf. Mangaraja Onggang Parlindungan, 
Pongkinangolngolan Sinambela Gelar Tuanku Rao: Teror Agama Islam Mazhab Hambali di 
Tanah Batak 1816-1833 (Yogyakarta: LKiS, 2007), p. 132. 
35 See “Memorandum of Tuanku Imam,” pp. 19-20.  
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the Qur'an and Muhammad's prophecy is to abolish slavery, and to 
establish justice and equality. 
Slavery in Minangkabau has its roots in the period prior to the 
coming of Islam. Slaves were considered the second-class citizens. 
After the coming of Islam, the system of slavery was only applied to 
non-Muslims. These slaves normally originated from such regions as 
Nias, Mentawai, Tapanuli and Riau, and a large number of them 
resided in remote parts of the nagari, quite isolated from the majority of 
the people. In most part, they were employed as laborers in agricultural 
sectors or as domestic workers, and by virtue of their being slaves, they 
could not get married to someone who was not slave. In certain phases 
of Minangkabau history, efforts were made to free these slaves, but 
these efforts came to no fruition and slavery was even regaining its 
momentum at the time of the coming of the Padris.36 Ironically, 
however, while the Padris spoke of the application of Shari >‘ah, they 
themselves, at the same time, violated the benevolent values of Islam 
and advocated instead the abhorrent self-made rules and regulations of 
the slavery system. 
The literalistic nature of their approach toward the Qur'an and the 
Sunnah seems to have made them unable to look beyond the literal 
meaning of the two major sources of Islam.37 Hence, they ignored the 
concept of Rah}ma>n according to which a rule must be underpinned by 
the spirit of compassion and forgiveness. The Padris failed to do this, 
and in their appeal to apply the rules of Shari >‘ah, they forgot that the 
heart of Shari >‘ah is compassion, respect, tolerance and justice. They 
also failed to respect other views and opinions on Islam and tended to 
go overboard when damning their foes as infidels and hypocrites. 
When a literalistic approach is applied, as El Fadl has noted,  one is 
forced to read a religious text in isolation from the historical and moral 
context. In this method of interpretation, the substantive content of 
the text may often be ignored. The result is a rigid, one-sided and 
inauthentic interpretation of Islam.38 This indeed was both the style 
                                                 
36 Graves, Asal Usul Elite Minangkabau Modern, pp. 29-31. 
37 See Fazlur Rahman, Islam and Modernity: Transformation of an Intellectual Tradition 
(Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1982), p. 4. 
38 Khaled Abou El Fadl, “Toleransi dalam Islam,” in Joshua Cohen and Ian Lague 
(eds), Cita dan Fakta Toleransi Islam: Puritanisme versus Pluralisme, Translation (Bandung: 
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and attitude of the Padris in their interpretation on the Qur’an and the 
Sunnah, a style that gave birth to their rigid and absurd understanding 
of this noble religion.  
In practical terms what this implied was that the Padris then 
tended to legitimize their acts and justify them on religious grounds, 
regardless of whether or not these acts were against moral norms and 
religious values.  The Padris were unequivocally fundamentalist in the 
literal sense of the word.  
The connotative and pejorative meaning of the word 
fundamentalism is still open to debate. It was first used to refer to the 
radical Protestant group in America in the beginning of the 20th 
century. Members of this group called themselves fundamentalists to 
distinguish them from liberal Protestants, whom they regarded as 
having been misled from the true faith of the religion. The Protestant 
fundamentalists, like the Wahha >bi >s and the Padris, employed a 
literalistic approach to their understanding of the teaching and 
tradition of their holy texts.39  
On many accounts, fundamentalism is peculiar, but not unique, to 
Christianity. Armstrong, following Martin E Marty and R. Scott 
Appleby, maintains that fundamentalism is a form of militant 
spiritualism vis-à-vis what is considered to be a moral crisis. Funda-
mentalism is a response toward the beliefs, and perhaps prejudices, of 
the secularists. In their attitude towards secular thought, the 
fundamentalists argue that the struggle to reveal its inherent lack of 
balance represents a cosmic war against evil. It should come as no 
surprise that in their bid to wage their war, fundamentalists first and 
foremost tend to resort to the strictest dogma of their religion as a way 
to preserve their faith against the perceived onslaught of the 
secularists. Dubbing themselves the only true representatives of their 
religion, fundamentalists of any religious tradition normally live an 
isolated life away from society and create their own community and 
culture.40  
In the same vein, Azra, modifying the thesis of Marty and 
Appleby, argues that a constant characteristic of fundamentalism is 
resistance against modernity, secularism, Western values, the methods 
                                                 
39 See Karen Armstrong, The Battle for God: Fundamentalism in Judaism, Christianity and 
Islam (London: HarperCollins Publishers, 2000), p. x. 
40 Ibid., p. xi. 
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of hermeneutics, pluralism, relativism (cultural and not religious 
relativism) and a rejection of the social and historical dynamism which 
fundamentalists deem to represent a threat toward religion.41 For 
Habermas, on the other hand, the main characteristic of funda-
mentalism is rigidity and stubbornness in imposing, politically and one-
sidedly, its values and convictions upon others, in order to disguise the 
fact that these values and convictions are irrational.42  
While there are subtle differences in these accounts concerning 
fundamentalism, these propositions nonetheless agree that funda-
mentalism,  in a broad sense,  is a form of rigid religiosity that calls for 
the direct return to the original sources of religion by means of 
violence and force.  
In the history of Islam, fundamentalism in the sense of returning 
to the original sources of religion and of interpreting these sources 
literally has been known since the early phase of its development. As 
such, it was first witnessed during the Tah}ki >m (peace deal) between Ali 
and Mu‘a>wiyah, when a third party, the Khawa>rij, declined to get 
involved in it. This third group turned violent and quickly pointed 
fingers at both Ali and Mu‘a>wiyah as infidels. In the view of the 
Khawa>rij, the two had committed a grave sin by agreeing on arbitrage 
which was in its nature against the very teaching of the holy texts. The 
two must therefore be killed. 
In Islam, fundamentalism confronts not only modernity but also 
its own tradition and legacy. Muslim fundamentalists are trapped in 
their own obsession as if they are beaten, isolated and marginalized not 
only by the lucrative power of modernity but also by the well-
preserved traditions of Islam.43 It seems Muslim fundamentalists were 
first frustrated by the traditions of Islam, and only second were 
marginalized by the lore of modernity.  
On these grounds, one may speak of two forms of fundamentalism 
in Islam. One is classical fundamentalism, and the other is neo-
fundamentalism. The Padri movement is close to the former. Since its 
                                                 
41 Azyumardi Azra, Pergolakan Politik Islam: Dari Fundamentalisme, Modernisme hingga Post-
Modernisme (Jakarta: Penerbit Paramadina, 1996), pp. 109-110. 
42 Giovanna Borradori, Filsafat dalam Masa Teror: Dialog dengan Jürgen Habermas dan 
Jacques Derida, Translation (Jakarta: Penerbit Buku Kompas, 2005), pp. 45-46. 
43 Khaled Abou El Fadl, “Islam and Theology of Power,” in Middle East Report, 221, 
(2001), from http://www.merip.org/mer/mer221/221-abu_el_fadl.html.  
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very inception, the proponents of this movement propagate the idea of 
the direct return to the Qur'an and to the purest form of Islam, that is, 
to the original form Islam revealed to the prophet Muhammad. Thus, 
the Padris did not acknowledge medieval Islam as representing the 
idealistic Islam. They also renounced the modern reality of Islam as 
not symbolizing the pure form of this religion. The Padris were 
obsessed by a pure form of Islam, the prophetic Islam as exemplified 
in the life of the Prophet Muhammad and in his four exemplary 
disciples. Peculiar to the Padris is furthermore their insistence on the 
truth-claim, that what was true was what they thought to be true. Truth 
became their commodity. 
It goes without saying, therefore, that the Padris,were incapable of 
distinguishing between Islam as ordained in the Qur'an and the Sunnah 
and Islam as the product of man’s discursive interpretation. The 
former is absolute while the latter may become obsolete over time. The 
grave mistake of the Padris lay in their assumption that the obsolete 
interpretation of Islam might represent, and perhaps replace, the 
absolute aspect. The truth is that the interpretation of Islam is subject 
to change and criticism, open to objection and re-interpretation, while 
the absolute aspect of Islam will stay as it is. In the final analysis, the 
Padris were by all standards absolutists who believed that criticism of 
them was an attack against Islam itself.  
The Radicalism of the Padris 
The radicalism of the Padris may be found in two domains, first in 
their discursive interpretation of Islam, and second in their day-to-day 
attitude towards others.  
Violence was the rule of the day for the Padris. This violence, to 
borrow from Galtung, took three forms: structural, occasional and 
cultural violence. Whereas the first two involved physical and direct 
violence against opposing parties, the third concerned the process of 
legitimization and justification of violence itself.  
The data at my disposal reveal that the Padris committed cultural 
violence by justifying what they did by means of religion, ideology, 
language and knowledge. They condemned their opponents as infidels 
by citing verses of the Qur'an and prophetic sayings. They 
systematically designed structural violence by marginalizing their 
opponents among individuals and groups of Minangkabau. This 
structural violence was then followed by occasional violence in the 
form of physical attacks, abduction and even assassination. All this was 
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justified by religion as if religion was responsible for these abhorrent 
acts. 
One of the violent acts that the Padris committed was the 
assassination of the royal family of Pagaruyung, Tanah Datar. This 
royal family converted to Islam in the 16th century and was attacked by 
the Padris in 1809. Puti Reno Raudha Thaib assumes that the tragic 
assassination happened when the Padris and representatives of certain 
traditional tribes were involved in an argument on matters of particular 
religious importance. In that argument, Tuanku Lelo of South 
Tapanuli, one of the Padri most ambitious leaders alleged that some 
members of royal family such as Tuanku Rajo Naro, Tuanku of Talang 
and another prince, were abandoning the tenets of Islam. They had 
become infidels, and must therefore be killed.44 The Padris were then 
provoked and ran amok, murdering all in their way, including the 
leading members of the royal family, one of the king's assistants, and 
some royal clerics.45  
Several years later, in 1815, the Padris led by Tuanku Lintau 
initiated another attack on the royal family. They murdered all its living 
members.46 Some historians relate that the Kingdom of Pagaruyung 
experienced attacks from the Padris on many occasions, as a result of 
which it finally collapsed.  
The Padris also intimidated their opponents and anyone who 
stood in their way including their own family members. Adrianus 
Khatib, a researcher, following Steijn Parve, believes that Tuanku Nan 
Renceh was responsible for the suffering of the elderly woman who 
happened to be his own aunt. When the poor woman died, he decreed 
that the body should not be properly buried, but be thrown away in 
the bushes. The lady was killed by the Padris simply because she ate 
                                                 
44 This includes a paper by A.A. Navis, Alam Terkembang Jadi Guru (Jakarta: PT Pustaka 
Grafiti Press, 1984); MD Mansur et. al., Sejarah Minangkabau, (Jakarta: Bharata, 1970); 
and Muhamad Radjab, Perang Paderi (Jakarta: Balai Pustaka, 1964). 
45 See Puti Reno Raudha Thaib, “Sejarah Istana Pagaruyung,” in http://groups.yahoo.-
com/group/RantauNet/message/61114. 
46 See Dobbin, “Economic Change in Minangkabau,” pp. 36-37; Cf. M.C. Ricklefs, 
“Islamizing Indonesia: Religion and Politics in Singapore’s Giant Neighbour,” public 
lecture Asian Civilisations Museum, Asia Research Institute, National University of 
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sirih leaves, something forbidden according Padri law.47 Ironically, 
however, this act–the murder by Tuanku Nan Renceh of his own 
aunt–was condoned by other members of the movement and was even 
applauded by the most fanatical.  
The above passages on the violence committed by the Padris and 
the civil wars they instigated may paint a picture of instability and 
never-ending chaos in Minangkabau. What was to follow was even 
worse. For it was this condition of instability that triggered the 
eventual coming of the Dutch to the land of Minangkabau. It may 
seem shameful but at the same time it is understandable, that some 
traditional tribal leaders and the royal family of Pagaruyung, in their 
attempts to defend themselves against the Padris, appealed to the 
Dutch for help. It was Sultan Muningsah of Pagaruyung who first 
invited the Dutch to come to Minangkabau. Agreement between the 
two parties soon followed. On the 21st February 1821, the traditional 
tribes of Minangkabau agreed to grant the Dutch the whole region of 
Lu(h)ak Nan Tigo (Agam, Tanah Datar and Lima Puluh Kota) on the 
condition that the Dutch protect them from the onslaught of the 
Padris. In April of the same year, the Dutch attacked Simawang and 
Sulit Air, and quickly controlled them after some little resistance from 
the Padris.48 Meanwhile, without request from the appealing tribes and 
royal family, the Dutch, on their own initiative expanded their 
domination over Tanah Datar and other surrounding areas.  
Soon after controlling Tanah Datar, the Dutch built a fortress in 
Batusangkar near the Pagaruyung palace from which they launched 
frantic attacks against the regions of Padang Lawas and Pandai Sikat in 
Agam. Here the Dutch built another castle, which subsequently 
became their stronghold in successive attacks on the region of Kota 
Baru. In this region, the Dutch encountered strong resistance from the 
Padris, even suffering defeat such as in the battle of Kapau, and they 
were forced to withdraw. In 1831, the Dutch, under the leadership of 
Colonel Elout, returned to Kapau and succeeded in capturing it. The 
colonizing power soon expanded its dominion and quickly controlled 
                                                 
47 Adrianus Khatib, “Kaum Padri dan Pemikiran Keagamaan di Minangkabau,” 
(Unpublished Ph.D Dissertation, Postgraduate Program, IAIN Syarif Hidayatullah, 
Jakarta, 1991), p. 269.  
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Alahan Panjang and Bonjol.49 Finally, the Dutch dominated 
Minangkabau, the last and the most important stronghold of the 
Padris.  
During the many years of the Dutch war with the Padris many 
peace deals, including cease-fire agreements, were signed by both 
parties. However, as soon as a peace deal was signed, both parties 
tended to return to war and attack each other. For instance, General de 
Stuers, chief commander of the Dutch military force in Padang, and 
Imam Bonjol signed a peace deal in 1824, but soon ruined the deal, 
violated it and took up arms again. In most cases, it was the Padris that 
initiated the attacks and committed anarchical acts against the Dutch. 
The Dutch generally acted only in self-defense.50  
In the meantime, the Padris had their own version of this whole 
issue. They maintained that it was the Dutch who violated the peace 
deals, initiated the attacks and embarked on incursions against the 
Padris. The Naskah Tuanku Imam Bonjol relates that when the two 
parties reached a peace deal, Colonel Elout, the successor of General 
Stuers,  promised in 1831 that he would not interfere with the social 
and religious affairs of the local people.51 In reality, however, when the 
Dutch occupied the region of Banjul, they, according to the Naskah,  
entered a mosque and broke into people's residences bringing with 
them dogs and other filthy materials. They also confiscated people’s 
belongings, compelled them to do hard labor and plundered their rice 
fields without compensation. The Naskah further mentions that the 
Dutch torched the local communities, often without any acceptable 
reason.52  
Be that as it may, whether it was the Dutch or the Padris that 
should be held accountable for these atrocities, countless testimonies 
have it that the Padris, amid social and political unrest in Minangkabau 
and while the people were suffering from the continuing war in the 
region, who kept on committing harassment against the hopeless. They 
also expanded their propagation to penetrate Mandailing, a region to 
the north of Minangkabau in 1820, and “forced” the local people to 
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embrace Islam.53 Here in Mandailing, the Padris again harassed the 
people and tortured them in the same way that they did in 
Minangkabau when they, under the leadership of Tuanku Tambusai 
and Tuanku Rao, terrorized the people with all sorts of threats and 
intimidation. 
In their attacks against their victims, the Padris often sought 
assistance from the Bataks, who themselves originated mostly from 
Mandailing.54 In this way the Padris divided the people in order to rule 
them.  
In Mandailing people were forced to defend themselves, and 
eventually they launched an armed struggle against the Padris, 
recruiting in the process people from all walks of life including pagans, 
Muslims, non-Muslims, immigrants and indigenous people. The latter 
were known as Lubus, and their leaders were Patuan Naga and Raja 
Gadombang. These two leaders tried to stand firm in their self-defense 
against the Padris, but without a great deal of success, and after 
consecutive failures, they sought military assistance from the Dutch in 
1832.55 The Dutch cooperated with the indigenous people and 
together they launched an attack on the Padris and gained an easy 
victory as a result. 
Violence by the Padris in Mandailing has been the subject of many 
studies. Harahap, following Willer, narrates that, in their efforts to 
intimidate their victims, the Padris surrounded their villages and 
threatened them with swords, burned down their houses and stole 
their belongings. They also commandeered people’s domestic animals 
and even murdered those whom they considered a danger to them. 
Those who survived the murder attempts during the raids were 
enslaved.56  
That is one view. Some scholars hold an opposing view and 
question whether the Padris were really that violent. These scholars 
doubt the authenticity of evidence for the hideous acts of the Padris. 
Lukas for example, believes that most of the information that stands 
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54 Ibid., p. 61. 
55 Ibid., p. 63. 
56 See Basyral Hamidy Harahap, Ggeret Tuanku Rao (Depok: Komunitas Bambu, 2007), 
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against the Padris is Dutch-based, and must therefore be questioned 
and investigated. He further warns that acts the Dutch committed 
against the Padris in particular and the people of Minangkabau in 
general resemble what Bush has done toward al-Qaeda and the 
Muslims at large.57 What Lukas and people like him try to say is that, as 
far as the historical information is concerned, the Dutch attempted to 
distort history, putting blames on the Padris and destroying the image 
of the Muslim in general.  
What Lukas questions then is the authenticity of the data. And 
Lukas is not alone. Hamka shares his skepticism, questioning the data 
presented by MO Parlindungan in his Tuanko Rao. To Hamka, this 
book lacks accuracy because it does not include in its pages solid and 
clear data. However, upon closer inspection, Hamka himself does in 
fact acknowledge that the Padris committed violence on many 
occasions. He quotes Hikayat Shaikh Jalaluddin of Faqih Shagir and 
remarks that:  
“… what is evil about the Padris is that they murdered 
clerics and scholars, raped married women, married women 
without their consent, committed fornication against 
prisoners of war, humiliated men of honor, and alleged that 
their opponents were infidels…”58 
Shagir, for his part, reports that when Tuanku Nan Renceh and his 
troops attacked the nagari Tilatang, they demolished its buildings and 
houses, pulled down public facilities, and robbed people's belongings 
and their animals. Those who survived the assault had to run away and 
take refuge in another region.59 It is narrated also in Naskah Tuanku 
Imam Bonjol, that Tuanku Imam Bonjol also acknowledged that during 
his leadership he and many of his colleagues and subordinates 
committed all sorts of violence including human trafficking and 
slavery.60  
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The data that I acquired from Shagir and the Naskah further reveal 
that the Padris used violence not only as a means of intimidation and 
victimization but also as an effective strategy to propagate their ideas 
and reform mission. There can be no doubt therefore that the Padris 
may be called radical on that point. 
One should be objective in looking at historical data. The Padris 
were radical, just as the Dutch were colonialist. Both committed 
atrocities equally against the innocent people of Minangkabau and 
represent the same form of radicalism by using religion and economic 
ambition respectively. Both victimized the local people and reduced 
them to a state of mental disorder.  
In view of this, the information provided by Parlindungan 
concerning the background of the Padri movement and its leadership 
cannot be overlooked. As he has discovered, Haji Piobang, one of the 
Padri leaders, was a retired colonel who used to work for Janiseri 
Kavaleri, a Turkish military unit. Similarly, Haji Sumanik, another Padri 
leader was a retired major who also used to work for another Turkish 
military unit. The two were not learned, and were purely military 
men.61 Looking at their background, it seems highly likely that the style 
of the Padri leadership was predominantly militaristic using torture and 
violence to persuade people and subdue them.  
The Padri Radicalism: Between Religiosity and the Politics of 
Domination 
The militaristic style of the Padri leadership, its thought and 
agendas all suggest that this movement was an extension of the 
Wahabi ideology in Saudi Arabia. Like the Wahha>bi >, the Padri 
movement was first of all concerned with the purification of Islamic 
teachings. But given the geographical and social milieu, the Padri 
movement had some internal uniqueness not exhibited by the Wahha>bi > 
group. In other words, while there were some striking similarities 
between the two movements, there were also some noticeable 
differences between them. They were the products of different 
geographical, cultural and social circumstances.  
Nonetheless, regarding their militancy and political mission, they 
seem to have been the same. They also shared the quality of absorbing 
the doctrines of their leaders and transforming those doctrines into 
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practical agendas. The two movements were both conscious that in 
order to succeed in their cause, there had to be a process of 
indoctrination, which would normally start from the idea that a return 
to the pure teaching of the Qur'an and the Sunnah was a must. This 
would then be followed by the creation of a so-called “Islamic 
identity”; an identity which would mostly be identifiable through dress, 
attitude, and a certain way of thinking. In their efforts to establish their 
dream community, the Wahha>bi > and Padri movements invented this 
new identity to distinguish themselves from others. 
To this it may be added that the attempt by the Padris in particular 
to invent the new identity was in fact a perfect testimony to their 
political, social and missionary failure. The Padris, it is noted by some 
historians, were generally not welcomed by the societies in which they 
operated.  To express their frustration at not gaining recognition from 
their community, they then invented a new community with a new 
identity.62 
The invention of this new community may also be a sign that the 
Padris were not happy with the hereditary system of their nagari. 
According to this system, people of no social status could not become 
the staff, let alone the elite, of the nagari. By and large the Padris came 
from the non-elite, so, having realized that they could not hold certain 
governmental posts at the nagari by virtue of their social status, they 
revolted and invented a community of their own.63  
Whatever the case might be, all the above evidence indicates that 
the Padris, in the pursuit of their cause, seemed to have employed 
violence and intimidation. Another point to note is that, what the 
Padris really wanted was power, and they did not hesitate to employ 
violence as the swiftest means to acquire that power. They also seemed 
to have realized that violence might serve as a vehicle to achieve 
internal and collective solidarity among their members. 
What is curious about the Padris is the fact that they attempted to 
centralize their power at the hands of certain individuals only. These 
individuals had to possess certain religious qualities such as good 
leadership, and being learned and well-versed in religious knowledge. 
The danger of this strategy was that when violence was perpetrated, it 
was committed symbolically in the name of religion, because the 
                                                 
62 See Abdullah, “Adat and Islam,” p. 14. 
63 See Graves, Asal Usul Elite Minangkabau Modern, p. 50. 
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leaders were men of religion, and was committed collectively because 
the power was politically centralized. 
Strangely enough, the Padris had a certain amount of success in 
gaining support from the masses. The religious sentiment that the 
movement was attached to helped it persuade people of “good 
religiosity” to follow its cause. Like other radical movements, the Padri 
successfully built a communal loyalty that would later serve as the very 
ground for its ideological foundation. Moreover, the loyalty that the 
Padris built was not based on customary traditions or social norms, but 
on religion and faith.64 In other words, it was religion, not local 
traditions, that counted. 
On these grounds, whatever the Padris did in violating certain rules 
or in intimidating people, they justified by the norms of their religion. 
This, in turn, irrevocably prompted further acts of violence in the 
name of religiosity. 
Bearing all this in mind, there can be no doubt that the Padri 
movement was fundamentalist or radical in nature. In these final 
passages, I would like to touch briefly on the meaning of 
fundamentalism and radicalism. I follow Olivier Roy in arguing that 
there is slight difference between the two, in that fundamentalism 
becomes radicalism when the fundamentalists’ dreams of realizing their 
objective is transformed into a practical agenda.65 The fantasy of the 
fundamentalists consists mostly of acquiring of power using religious 
sentiment. I would also like to add that these two concepts – 
radicalism and fundamentalism – do seem to be related. In my view, 
radicalism develops out of the womb of fundamentalism. Political and 
social conflict is the result of fundamentalism, but the act of being 
anarchical in this conflict is called radicalism.  
Moving to the discursive domain, radicalism and fundamentalism 
tend to be the product of the same mentality. In general, both radicals 
and fundamentalists are people of superficial understanding of their 
religion, developing a correspondingly short-sighted view concerning 
the religion itself, society and democracy.66 This superficial 
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understanding of religion is the result of a methodological shortcoming 
according to which a particular religion is deemed truer than another, 
or one society is thought to be better than another. This kind of 
methodology is called ‘scriptural’ or ‘literalistic’, and often, to say the 
least, ignores the historical and social context in interpreting religious 
texts. Text is always true in what it says without any consideration of 
the social, cultural and historical background of a society. Social and 
historical contexts are assumed dead. The text is understood in 
isolation of these contexts.  
Having shed light on the methodological mode of the Padris, I 
may repeat that, in this respect, the Padris share a lot with the 
Wahha >bi >s. The only slight difference – discontinuity, borrowing 
Foucault67- lies in the social and cultural backgrounds out of which 
they were born. This difference in social and cultural backgrounds 
does give rise to different traits in terms of propagation strategy or in 
organizational structure. Hence, the Wahha >bi >s, for instance, in their 
strategy to counter the attacks of the Ottoman Empire, recruited 
members of various tribes around the Saudi Peninsula. But the Padris 
never did the same. They, on the contrary, distanced themselves from 
the tribes and regarded these tribes as their enemies that must be 
banished. The Padri strategy, in this particular instance, led to war, 
conflict and discord, while the Wahha>bi > strategy produced peace and 
accord.  
The Padris were also selective when drawing their religious tenets 
from Wahha>bi > dogmas. While, in certain areas, the Padris adopted 
Wahha >bi > doctrines wholeheartedly, in others, they did not. The Padris 
sometimes also combined Wahha >bi > doctrines with Ash’arite teachings. 
Thus, according to the Naskah Tuanku Imam Bonjol, as cited by Dobbin, 
the Padris, in their accounts of the twenty attributes of God,68 adopted 
the view of the Ash‘a >riyah and combined it with the doctrine of the 
Wahha >bi >yah. What the Padris intended to do in these instances was to 
persuade people that their views were sound and justifiable because 
                                                                                                      
Ghuluwwu wa al-I‘tida >l: Ru’yah Manha>ji>yyah Sha >milah (Makkah al-Mukarramah, 5-9 Dhu 
al-Qa‘dah 1424 H), pp. 36-37.  
67 See Michel Foucault, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,” in D. F. Bouchard (ed.), 
Language, Counter-Memory Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1977), p. 154. 
68 Dobbin “Tuanku Imam Bondjol,” p. 13. 
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they were based not only on Wahha>bi >yah but also on the authoritative 
Ash‘a>riyah school of thought.   
Ultimately it is clear that the Padris aimed at politicizing Islam and 
its teachings by using the doctrines of Wahha >bi >yah and Ash‘a >riyah. 
When these doctrines were formulated in political terms, a tendency 
toward acquiring power and domination became even more apparent. 
Religion was ideologicized, the purpose of this ideologicization being 
none other than power, domination and authority.  
The differences that the two movements have were social, political 
and cultural, as well as economic. Some argue that economic factors 
actually gave rise to the emergence of the Padri movement, other 
factors being merely to the economic factor. When they planned 
certain agendas, the Padris often had an economic purpose in mind. 
Thus, when they invaded the region of Tanah Datar, they first 
captured areas with rich natural resources and ignored the others.69 
Similarly, when they expanded to the north, they took as their bounty 
agricultural products such as rice, corns, sugarcane, and the like. Gusti 
Asnan, a historian, testifies in weekly Tempo magazine that when the 
Padris were forced to surrender to the Dutch in the south, they fled to 
Pasaman and Tapanuli, two rich regions with diverse natural resources. 
They moved there first of all because of the regions’ rich and fertile 
land. It produced mainly coffee.   
That the Padris were in need of money was understandable. They 
needed to fund their propagation as well as their war against other 
tribes, foes and above all the Dutch.70  
To speak of the radicalism of the Padris one does need to consult 
the view of Taufik Abdullah, an authoritative historian in modern 
Indonesia. He, as Lucius cites, maintains that in their radicalism the 
Padris were driven not only by religious ideals, but also by economic 
and political obsessions.71 
Bassam Tibi, in his thesis concerning religious fundamentalism, 
argues that in their determination to grab cultural, economic, social and 
political ends the fundamentalists tend to manipulate and distort 
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religious symbols.72 Al-Jabiri argues along the same lines. In his view, 
radicalism cannot be looked at simply as social and historical 
phenomenon, but also as a religious problem.73  
Bearing in mind these accounts, it is safe then to assume that 
religious fundamentalism is a form of politicization of religion. It 
reduces religion to a mere political practice. This holds true for all 
fundamentalist groups. With a slight difference in degree all 
fundamentalist groups use religion as their vehicle and distort its 
teachings for political interests.   
That the Padris, in their manipulation of religion, ended up in 
violence is clear. What is not clear is whether they themselves realized 
that they had manipulated religion and committed violence along with 
the process of manipulation. Interestingly, it is narrated in Naskah 
Tuanku Imam Bonjol, (as cited by Harahap) that Tuanku Imam Bonjol 
did realize that. He once issued an order to his followers to give back 
the bounty they had grabbed in the regions of Bonjol and Lubuk 
Sikaping to the original owners.74 In another part of the Naskah (as 
cited by Dobbin) he was said to have told his son Su(l)tan Caniago, in 
the minutes before his surrender to the Dutch, to honor and obey 
religious and customary leaders, and learn the Islamic science 
concerning the twenty attributes of God.75 The assumption behind this 
narration implies that Tuanku Imam Bonjol seems to have repented 
from his horrendous acts and did not want his followers and son to do 
the same.  
Nonetheless, what Tuanku Imam Bonjol did does not reflect the 
policy and mentality of all Padri members. The fact remains that the 
Padris did continue to commit violence especially under the leadership 
of Tuanku Tambusai. 
History reveals that the Padris never succeeded in disseminating 
their radical views and agendas. By 1833, the people of Minangkabau 
had already realized that the dull radicalism of the Padris with its 
catastrophic impact must be brought to an end. A group of people 
                                                 
72 Bassam Tibi, The Challenge of Fundamentalism: Political Islam and the New World Disorder, 
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therefore initiated a public meeting involving the Padris, the tribal 
leaders and community members. They proposed that reconciliation 
must be achieved, and that all elements of the people of Minangkabau 
should rather join forces to combat the Dutch. This effort came to no 
fruition, and the Padris walked out. In their stubbornness, they 
declined to reconcile with the tribal leaders and other community 
members, and chose instead to go their own way in pursuing their 
obsessions. 
The lesson behind this initiative is that, while the radical nature of 
the Padri movement in Minangkabau was clear, a larger part of this 
community remained moderate and polite. They respected tolerance 
and pluralism. They were the patrons of peace and harmony. They 
seem to have realized that society could not be built upon conflict and 
discord. Society must be built upon understanding, respect and accord. 
Accord, and not discord, was the key. Peace was a precious good. 
Where violence predominated, the whole society would suffer. When 
war struck, peace would be a piece of history.  
Conclusion  
History will never repeat itself. Tragedy has its own space and 
time. The tragedy and atrocity of the Padris were not the same as the 
tragedy and atrocity of the Wahha >bi >s. Each movement had its own 
history and fate. What can be said of the Padris cannot be said of the 
Wahha >bi >s and vice versa. Nonetheless, these two movements share 
similarities. Both, for example, were radical in their determination to 
establish what they thought of as pure Islamic values. In addition, both 
were manipulative of religious symbols in pursuit of their political 
agendas. 
The complexity that reveals itself in investigating such radical 
groups as the Padri and Wahha>bi > movements stands as the paramount 
testimony that groups such as these deserve to be studied. Within such 
study lies a concern to expose the notion of continuity –and also 
discontinuity– between religion and politics, and the relation between 
religion and state.  
However, it is naïve, to say, for example, that the Padri movement 
represented Islamic values and Muslim idealism as a whole. It is even 
naïve to say that the Padri movement was always about radicalism for 
there are accounts which say otherwise. The Padri movement was one 
thing and Islam is quite another. Moreover, each radical movement has 
its own space and time. What a radical movement did in a particular 
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space and time cannot be said as representing other movements or 
persons of entirely different space and time.  
Nonetheless, one cannot be silent in the face of radicalism. Over 
time, the lore of radicalism has brought catastrophic atrocities against 
humanity. One needs to be cognizant therefore of the peril of 
radicalism, or else other people may be its next victims. Radicalism 
equals to death. Once violence reigns, death follows. By virtue of 
radicalism innocent people can be physically, mentally and 
physiologically victimized. They may lose their future, their loved ones, 
belongings, wealth and even life.  
On the other hand, the history of humanity has shown that 
violence cannot be dealt with by violence. Vis-à-vis violence one must 
abstain from violence. One must maintain public order and observe 
moral virtues. Those who claim to be religious must try to understand 
the message of their religion in moral and spiritual terms so that the 
moral message embodied in all religions may be revealed. All religions 
are morally and spiritually appealing. So, it is appalling to see that one 
cannot learn from the moral and spiritual message of religion.  
To free religion from the cage of politics is, therefore, necessary. 
Religion must be treated properly and proportionally as a source of 
morality. Failing to do this would have the unfortunate consequence of 
banishing religion from its public role. As a source of morality, religion 
is capable of bringing peace and harmony, enabling people of whatever 
race, culture, language, ethnicity and even religion to sit together and 
achieve common goals. Religion is the inspiration for justice-seekers 
with its noticeable concept of equality, respect and tolerance. [] 
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